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Abstract 
 
The use of science for policy is at the core of a perfect storm generated by the 
insurgence of several concurrent crises: of science, of trust, of sustainability. The 
prevailing modern positivistic model of science for policy, known as ‘evidence based 
policy’, is based on dramatic simplifications and compressions of available perceptions 
of the state of affairs and possible explanations (hypocognition). Therefore this model 
can result in flawed prescriptions. The flaws become more evident when dealing with 
complex issues characterized by concomitant uncertainties in the normative, descriptive 
and ethical domains.  In this situation evidence-based policy may concur to the fragility 
of the social system.  
 
Science plays an important role in reducing the feeling of vulnerability of humans by 
projecting a promise of protection against uncertainties. In many applications 
quantitative science is used to remove uncertainty by transforming it into probability, so 
that mathematical modelling can play the ritual role of haruspices. This epistemic 
governance arrangement is today in crisis.  
 
The primacy of science to adjudicate political issues must pass through an assessment of 
the level of maturity and effectiveness of the various disciplines deployed.  The solution 
implies abandoning dreams of prediction, control and optimization obtained by relying 
on a limited set of simplified narratives to define the problem and moving instead to an 
open exploration of a broader set of plausible and relevant stories.   
 
Evidence based policy has to be replaced by robust policy, where robustness is tested 
with respect to feasibility (compatibility with processes outside human control); 
viability (compatibility with processes under human control, in relation to both the 
economic and technical dimensions), and desirability domain (compatibility with a 
plurality of normative considerations relevant to a plurality of actors).   
 
Key words: Evidence based policy, science for governance, STS, Post-Nomal 
Science  
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Section 1 – Science for policy. Predicaments and doubts  
 
The incoming commission must find better ways of separating evidence-
gathering processes from the ‘political imperative’. 
 
In a critique of science’s use for policy A. Glover, former Chief Science Adviser of the 
President of the European Commission, laments that too often evidence based policy 
turns into its opposite, policy based evidence, and for this reason she appeals to a more 
rigid separation of science and policy (Wildson, 2014). 
 
Are these diagnosis and therapy right? In this section we claim that this is not the case, 
and that the problem runs much deeper, where concomitant crises of science, trust and 
of sustainability call for different medicines that just separating evidence from policy.  
 
We shall use mostly insights from two field of scholarship: the first is known as science 
and technology studies (STS), and the second is bioeconomics. 
 
As per the former field we shall make frequent reference to style of policy engaged 
science described by Funtowicz and Ravetz as Post Normal Science (PNS) were "facts 
are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent" (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1991, 1992, 1993). We deal here with epistemic governance, defined as “how 
knowledge for policymaking should be understood and governed” (Pearce and Raman, 
2014).  
 
As per the second field of inquiry we shall mostly follow on the tradition of Nicholas 
Georgescu Roegen and Robert Rosen (Rosen, 1991; Giampietro, 2013), where the 
epistemological implications of complexity are addressed at the moment of generating 
quantitative analysis.    
  
 
1.1 Times ripe with controversy 
 
It would be naïve to reconsider the place and the style of science support to policy 
neglecting the increasing climate of controversy which in recent years has marked 
practically all instances in which science has been used to a policy end. From the impact 
of pesticides on bees to the culling of badgers, from the greenhouse potential of the 
refrigerant liquid used by Mercedes Benz to the impact of endocrine disruptors, from 
the benefits of shale gas fracking to the fate of children raised by gay parents, from the 
true long term cost of citizenship for illegal migrants to the desirability of international 
testing and comparison of the educational attainment of children, all is matter of 
contention where the relevant science is disputed.  Until recently these levels of 
antagonism were reserved for issues such as anthropogenic climate change and 
genetically modified organisms (GMO), the quintessential ‘wicked’ issues (Rittel & 
Webber 1973) - issues so deeply entangled in a web of hardly separable facts, interests 
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and values that there cannot be agreements among different parties about the nature of 
the problem. Dan Kahan (2014) has observed that climate change affects us so 
intimately that it can define who we are culturally and normatively. We postulate that 
this kind of affection, and the related attitude toward scientific facts, can be found in 
many other issues, beside climate change, and that therefore, the unavoidable presence 
of cultural and normative bias cannot be silenced by scientific proficiency.   
 
 
1.2 Science’s own crisis and its roots   
 
Science own house seems at present in a state of crisis.  The Economist – a periodical - 
titles on his cover “How Science goes wrong” (2013). Its main editorial reads:  
 
Science still commands enormous—if sometimes bemused—respect. But its 
privileged status is founded on the capacity to be right most of the time and to 
correct its mistakes when it gets things wrong. […] The false trails laid down by 
shoddy research are an unforgivable barrier to understanding. 
 
The Economist’s piece draws from and an increasing number of academic papers and 
editorials lamenting a drop in reproducibility and a corresponding increase in retraction 
of scientific work. ‘Unreliability in scientific literature’ and ‘systematic bias in research’ 
are lamented by Boyd (2013, Nature).  “Laboratory experiments cannot be trusted 
without verification”, argues Sanderson for organic chemistry research (2013, Nature).  
‘Suspected work […in] the majority of preclinical cancer papers in top tier journals’ is 
denounced by Begley (2013, Nature). In a landmark study of results in cancer science 
Begley and Ellis were able to reproduce only 11 per cent of the original findings (2012). 
That this may result in a death sentence for patients on experimental trials (with pharma 
having passed the pre-clinical phase) gives an idea of the seriousness of the issue.   
 
The issue is not confined to natural and medical sciences. “I see a train wreck looming” 
warns Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman with behavioral sciences in his sight (Yong, 
2012); Joseph Stiglitz (2010), another laureate, condemns perverse incentives in the 
modelling of financial products at the hearth of the present economic recession. 
 
According to The Economist’s issue just quoted the main problem is a general lack of 
statistical skills among scientists, e.g. in balancing false positives and false negatives. 
Poor refereeing is also pointed to. The issue is perhaps more serious than can be 
corrected by statistical training. According to Ioannides (2005): 
 
A research finding is less likely to be true when . . . there is greater financial and 
other interest and prejudice; and when more teams are involved in a scientific 
field in chase of statistical significance. 
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The situation is so serious that a Meta-Research Innovation Centre (METRICS) has 
been launched at Stanford, involving the same John Ioannidis, to combat ‘bad science’ 
(The Economist, (2014). The same author contends (2014) that as a result of shoddy 
science as much as 85% of research funding is wasted. The peer review system at the 
hearth of science’s quality control mechanism is itself in a status of crisis: suffices here 
to mention titles such as “Springer and Université Joseph Fourier release SciDetect to 
discover fake scientific papers” (Springer, 2015) and “China’s Publication Bazaar” – 
and subtitled: “A Science investigation has uncovered a smorgasbord of questionable 
practices including paying for author’s slots on papers written by other scientists and 
buying papers from online brokers”.  See Funtowicz, and Ravetz, (2015) for a 
discussion.   
The present crisis of science was predicted by Jerome R. Ravetz already in 1971. In his 
book ‘Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems’ he notes (p.22): 
 
[…] with the industrialization of science, certain changes have occurred which 
weaken the operation of the traditional mechanism of quality control and 
direction at the highest level. […]The problem of quality control in science is 
thus at the centre of the social problems of the industrialized science of the 
present period. If it fails to resolve this problem […] then the immediate 
consequences for morale and recruitment will be serious; and those for the 
survival of science itself, grave.  
 
The centrality of ethics for the quality and the self-governance of science so clearly 
illustrated by Ravetz is also central to the work of Jean-François Lyotard. In his 1979 
work ‘La Condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir’ he tackles the de-legitimization 
of knowledge (identified with science) when this becomes an industrialized commodity 
– as opposed to the instrument of emancipation and betterment of human beings 
(bildung). Philip Mirowski describes the degeneration of industrialized science in the 
US with painstaking detail in his work (2011) ‘Science-Mart: Privatizing American 
Science’. According to Mirowski after the eighties neoliberal ideologies succeeded in 
decreasing state intervention in the funding of science, which became increasingly 
privatized and sub contracted, generating the perverse system of incentive already 
mentioned by Ioannides and Stiglitz.    
 
In conclusion although we do not know whether the collapse in trust in science for 
policy is motivated by the problems of science for science, we suspect that we cannot 
tackle the latter without solving the former.  
 
According to Lyotard (ibidem) it is since the age of Plato the question of the legitimacy 
of science is inextricably connected to that of the legitimacy of the legislator:  
 
‘Who decides what counts as knowledge and who knows about what one must 
decide? […] The question of knowledge in the information society is more than 
ever the question of government’.  
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‘Solutions to the problem of knowledge are solutions to the problem of social order’ is a 
conclusion of Steven Shapin & Simon Schaffer 1985 book ‘Leviathan and the Air-
Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life’. All this implies that our chosen 
epistemologies are not issues for academicians and philosophers, but a direct concern 
for the entire polity.   
 
Going back to Anne Glover’s diagnosis and therapy we can now observe that a better 
separation between science and policy corresponds to a well identified epistemology: 
one known as ‘demarcation model’ (Funtowicz, 2006). This models aims at protecting 
science from the political interference, preventing possible abuse of science and 
scientific information driven by agendas. It prescribes a clear demarcation between the 
institutions (and individuals) who provide the science and those where it is used. 
 
The demarcation model is challenged in more recent epistemologies, mostly based on 
the impossibility to achieve separation between facts and values. The idea of an algid 
and disinterested science which manages to interface itself cleanly with the messiness of 
the political process is an abstraction devoid of salience. Instead of purified facts we 
mostly deals with hybrid arrangements (Latour, 1991), and one of the features of the 
present epistemic governance crisis is that “the more knowledge is produced in hybrid 
arrangements, the more the protagonists will insist on the integrity, even veracity of 
their findings” (Grundmann, 2009).  
 
Alternatives epistemologies are offered by ‘Post Normal Science’ – already mentioned - 
and by the ‘Co-production of knowledge’ (Jasanoff, 1996); a review is in Carrozza, 
(2014).     
 
The attention here is to issues of participation, legitimacy, transparency and 
accountability. In the ‘extended participation model’ (Funtowicz, 2006) the deliberation 
is extended both across disciplines – acknowledging that different disciplines see 
though different lenses, and across communities of both experts and stakeholders. When 
adopting this model one moves from ‘speaking truth to power’ towards ‘working 
deliberatively within imperfections’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990, 1993; van der Sluijs 
et al., 2008; see also www.nusap.net). 
 
The remark has been made that the movement known as ‘Citizens’ Science’ should be 
more responsive to official science’s predicaments (McQuillan, 2014) and ‘pick up the 
gauntlet’ thrown by official science’s contested hegemony. PNS is suggested by these 
authors as a promising avenue to move in this direction. The same fathers of PNS ask 
speculatively “Is the internet to science what the Gutenberg press was to the church?” 
noting that “[…] the new social media have given strength to the extended peer 
community in science in a way reminiscent of the contribution of printing to the 
Reformation” and “Collegial peer review is being rapidly transformed to review by an 
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‘extended peer community,’ raising important issues to the governance of science” 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2015).   
 
 
1.3 Trust, modelling, uncertainties   
 
In a recent speech before the European Parliament Pope Francesco has recently sent a 
blunt ‘the emperor has no clothes’ message. A quote:     
 
The great ideas which once inspired Europe seem to have lost their attraction, 
only to be replaced by the bureaucratic technicalities of its institutions. As the 
European Union has expanded, there has been growing mistrust on the part of 
citizens towards institutions considered to be aloof, engaged in laying down 
rules perceived as insensitive to individual peoples, if not downright harmful 
 
The link of this warning to science for policy may not seem obvious but it is there 
nonetheless, as rules are the result of policies, and policies are defended on the basis of 
‘evidence’. As a relevant example consider how science was recruited to advocate 
austerity in public budgets. A 90% ratio of public debt to gross domestic product was 
stipulated by Harvard professors Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart as an absolute 
ceiling above which growth would be hampered. Thus debt ratios above this limit were 
defined as unsafe for a country. A later reanalysis by researchers from the University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst disproved this finding by tracing it to a coding error in the 
authors' original work. Clearly once this particular result was repudiated the policies had 
already be put in place and “In Britain and Europe, great damage has been done as a 
result.” (Cassidy, 2013).  
 
This is but one of the many instances where improper use of mathematical modelling 
has been instrumental of supporting flawed policies. Modelling hubris and its 
consequences are discussed in (Saltelli et al., 2013, Saltelli & Funtowicz, 2014). In his 
2013 work ‘Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the 
Financial Meltdown’ Philip Mirowski devotes a long section (pp 275-286) to the story 
of how dynamic stochastic general models (DSGE) were the subject of a hearing in the 
US senate  – ‘an event in 2010 that was literally unprecedented in the history of 
economic thought in America’, p. 275, with sworn testimony of economists such as 
Sidney Winter, Scott Page, Robert Solow, David Colander and V.V. Chari, to 
understand how ‘theorists tools’ had come to be used as policy instruments and why 
these instruments were all but useless in anticipating the economic crisis. Queen 
Elisabeth had a similar moment with British economists at the London School of 
Economics (Pierce, 2008).    
 
Saltelli and Funtowicz (2014) list several problems in the way mathematical modelling 
is used to tame uncertainty in relation to the production of evidence for policy. These 
include the rhetorical or ritual use of possibly disproportionate mathematical models to 
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impress or obfuscate, the reliance on tacit possibly unverified assumptions, the 
instrumental inflation or deflation of uncertainties according to expedience, the 
instrumental compression and linearization of the analysis as to tame complexity and to 
convey an impression of prediction and control, and finally an absent or perfunctory 
sensitivity analysis.  
 
An original insight on science’s lost hegemony comes from Dan Sarewitz (2000). For 
this scholar the problem is not a lack of Science but of its abundance:  
 
“Rather than resolving political debate, science often becomes ammunition in 
partisan squabbling, mobilized selectively by contending sides to bolster their 
positions. Because science is highly valued as a source of reliable information, 
disputants look to science to help legitimate their interests. In such cases, the 
scientific experts on each side of the controversy effectively cancel each other 
out, and the more powerful political or economic interests prevail, just as they 
would have without the science.” 
 
 
Section 2. Vulnerability, uncertainty and governance.  
 
 
2.1 Science to tame human vulnerability: the Cartesian Dream 
 
Humans are reflexive anticipatory systems capable to monitor and predict, to a certain 
extent, events associated with their interaction with the environment (Rosen, 1985).  
This provided them with a major comparative advantage against other species. The 
domain of homo sapiens on the planet seems so pervasive that the present era has been 
termed Anthropocene. When taken as isolated individuals human beings are vulnerable 
and, as a species, humans still depend on processes outside their control for their 
surviving. These sources of vulnerability have forced humans to build their identity 
around organized communities and to adopt religious beliefs. The legitimization of 
power in a social group is based on the willingness of individuals to trade part of their 
autonomy, via social contracts, in exchange of a reduction of their vulnerability to a 
host of needs (in the sense of Maslow), such as personal security against hostile action 
of other human beings; food, energy and water security; housing and job security; 
health care; environmental security; cultural identity and participation. No human 
society was ever able to provide protection against death.   However, a reduction in the 
feeling of vulnerability to this event was possible through religion. In particular, 
introducing the concept of an eternal life after death attenuated the fear associated with 
the loss of the physical body, thus providing a considerable power to those religions 
which were able to sustain the claim. 
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For this reason, for a long period of time societies were ruled by a combination of 
religious and military power. With the French revolution and the onset of modernity the 
new ruling class replaced religion with science, following on the prophecies of Francis 
Bacon (1561-1626) and the more recent formulations of René Descartes (1596-1650) 
and Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794,) on how all social problems 
would ultimately be tamed by knowledge. In modern times the prophecy’s main tenets 
have been cogently expressed by Vannevar Bush (1890-1974) right at the end of War 
World II. In the synthesis of Rommetveit et al., 2013:   
 
Bacon formulated the basic belief that knowledge gives us power to act in the 
world to the benefit of our lives. Condorcet elaborated the utopia of a science-
based society as one of welfare, equality, justice and happiness. Bush argued 
that scientific progress and a strong public funding of basic science are 
necessary conditions to sustain economic growth by the development of new 
products (or innovation in contemporary vocabulary).  
 
Bacon’s utopia, as described in the Magnalia Naturae, an appendix to the New Atlantis, 
includes “wonders of nature, in particular with respect to human use”, which reads 
(Bacon, 1627): 
 
The prolongation of life; The restitution of youth in some degree; The 
retardation of age; The curing of diseases counted incurable; The mitigation of 
pain; More easy and less loathsome purgings; The increasing of strength and 
activity; The increasing of ability to suffer torture or pain; The altering of 
complexions, and fatness and leanness; The altering of statures; The altering of 
features; The increasing and exalting of the intellectual parts; Versions of 
bodies into other bodies; Making of new species; Transplanting of one species 
into another; Instruments of destruction, as of war and poison; Exhilaration of 
the spirits, and putting them in good disposition; Force of the imagination, 
either upon another body, or upon the body itself; Acceleration of time in 
maturations; Acceleration of time in clarifications; Acceleration of putrefaction; 
Acceleration of decoction; Acceleration of germination; Making rich composts 
for the earth; Impressions of the air, and raising of tempests; Great alteration; 
as in induration, emollition, &c; Turning crude and watery substances into oily 
and unctuous substances; Drawing of new foods out of substances not now in 
use; Making new threads for apparel ; and new stuffs, such as paper, glass, &c; 
Natural divinations; Deceptions of the senses; Greater pleasures of the senses; 
Artificial minerals and cements.  
 
One century later  Condorcet was so convinced of physics’ ability to solve human 
predicaments that in the Ninth Epoch of his ‘Sketch for a Historical Picture of the 
Progress of the Human Spirit’ he states: “All the errors in politics and in morals are 
founded upon philosophical mistakes, which, themselves, are connected with physical 
errors” (Condorcet, 1785). 
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Closer to our times Vannevar Bush’s dream was couched in the Endless Frontier 
metaphor (1945):   
 
One of our hopes is that after the war there will be full employment. […]To 
create more jobs we must make new and better and cheaper products […] new 
products and processes are not born full-grown. They are founded on new 
principles and new conceptions which in turn result from basic scientific 
research. Basic scientific research is scientific capital […] It has been basic 
United States policy that Government should foster the opening of new frontiers. 
It opened the seas to clipper ships and furnished land for pioneers. Although 
these frontiers have more or less disappeared, the frontier of science remains.  
 
The reason we quote these very old or just old texts is that in spite of the copious ink 
poured by social sciences and STS scholarship in warning about the limits of Cartesian 
Dream, from Stephen Toulmin’s ‘Return to Reason’ and ‘Cosmopolis’ to Paul 
Feyerabend’s ‘Against Method’, from Lyotard’s ‘The Post-Modern Condition’ to Bruno 
Latour’s ‘We have never been modern’, and the fact that a major science war was 
fought between natural and human sciences in between the eighties and the ninetiesi, the 
Cartesian dream is still a prevailing narrative. Jerome Ravetz (1971, p. 387) calls this 
the folk-science of the educated classes: 
 
Indeed, we may say that the basic folk-science of the educated sections of the 
advanced societies is 'Science' itself in various senses derived from the 
seventeenth-century revolution in philosophy. This is quite explicit in figures of 
the Enlightenment such as Condorcet […] a basic faith in the methods and 
results of the successful natural sciences, as the means to the solution of the 
deepest practical problems […]  
 
.  
 
As discussed by Stephen Toulmin in ‘Cosmopolis, The Hidden Agenda of Modernity’ 
the XVII century vision of Cosmopolis, a society as rationally ordered as the Newtonian 
physics, perpetrated - thanks to its extraordinary success in many fields of endeavour - 
an agenda of prediction and control; an agenda whereby ecosystems and social systems 
could be fitted into precise and manageable rational categories. The agenda now more 
than ever crashes against the complexities of the present crisis, endangering the 
legitimacy of the existing social contracts.  
 
 
2.2  Reductionism, hypocognition and socially constructed ignorance  
 
We started this paper with the ‘evidence based policy model’. In this section we try to 
show that this model is based on a series of dramatic simplification and linearization 
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which are congruent with the both the Cartesian dream and what has been termed 
‘Hypocognition’ (Lakoff, 2010), ‘Socially constructed ignorance’ (Rayner, 2012), and 
much earlier by Jerome R. Ravetz, ‘Usable Ignorance’ (1987).   
 
Confronted with complex issues the application of Cartesian method of reduction with 
the goal of individuating linear and direct causal explanations becomes inadequate.  
Within this paradigm the scientific advisors determining fish quotas will be brought to 
court either if they have set the quota too high (for the consequent collapse of the catch) 
or too low (for the consequent loss of income for the fishermen).  Volcanologists can be 
sentenced to jail, as in the case Aquila’s (Italy) earthquake - though the sentence was 
reversed on appeal - because of miscommunication on the unavoidable uncertainty 
associated with earthquake predictions.  
 
Quantitative analysis is predicated on a selection of a problem structuring (the adoption 
of a frame). This determines in any case a major compression of the information space 
that is later on used for governance.  The compression is operated both at the normative 
level (one world view is adopted – the choice of the WHY) and at the level of the 
representation - what are the salient attributes relevant for the description of the system 
– the choice of the HOW (Giampietro et al. 2013).     
 
This process is explained by Rayner (2012) in terms of socially constructed ignorance, 
which is not the result of a conspiracy but of the sense-making process of individuals 
and institutions: 
 
To make sense of the complexity of the world so that they can act, individuals 
and institutions need to develop simplified, self-consistent versions of that world. 
The process of doing so means that much of what is known about the world 
needs to be excluded from those versions, and in particular that knowledge 
which is in tension or outright contradiction with those versions must be 
expunged. […] But how do we deal with […] dysfunctional cases of 
uncomfortable knowledge […]? 
 
   
This compression comes to a cost and can lead to the degeneration of a given 
arrangement, when generalized and institutionalized, eventually producing a situation of 
Ancien Régime.  Then the inability of the system to cope with stressors leads to a 
strategy of denial, and to the refusal to process either internal or external signals, 
including those of danger (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994).  
 
The compression of the information space results into ignoring knowledge which is 
available in established scientific disciplines which is not considered in the given 
problem structuring. Rayner call these the “unknown knowns”, e.g. that knowledge 
which exists out there in academia and society but is actively removed by the 
compression. For Rayner “unknown knowns [are] those which societies or institutions 
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actively exclude because they threaten to undermine key organizational arrangements 
or the ability of institutions to pursue their goals.” 
 
Also ignored after the compression are the “known unknowns” – knowledge of gaps 
and areas of ignorance which is available but is not considered as relevant in the chosen 
issue definition.   
 
The result of this compression is to focus the attention of the analysts on a finite set of 
attributes and goals. This fatally calls for process of optimization, e.g. the analyst ends 
up investing time and energies to find the best solution in the wrong problem space.  
 
Needless to say the hubris generated in this way increases fragility, foremost in relation 
to “unknown unknowns”, as the optimization implies a reduction of the diversity of 
behaviours (because of the elimination of the less performing alternatives within the 
chosen problem structuring) and therefore a reduction of adaptability (because of the 
neglect of attributes and goals not considered in the optimization). The issue is 
discussed at length in Nassim N. Taleb work ‘Antifragile’ (2012). 
 
 
A lesson from bioeconomics (Giampietro et al., 2013) is that science should be able to 
address and integrate relevant events and processes that can only be observed and 
described by adopting simultaneously non-equivalent narratives (dimensions of 
analysis) and different scales (descriptive domains).  In this case the virtue of 
reductionism (making possible rational choices based on a clear identification of 
relevant attributes, goals and direct explanations) becomes a vice. A rationality based on 
a simple problem structuring that is applied to solve a complex issue becomes a “mad 
rationality” – a concept attributed to social philosopher Lewis Mumford .  The example 
of bioethanol from corn, where  hundreds of billions of tax payer money have been 
invested in developing an alternative energy source that consumes more or less the same 
amount of energy carriers that it produces can be a good example of this effect 
(Giampietro and Mayumi, 2009). The story could continue to discuss how the same 
biofuels are considered in the public discourse as a strategy to mitigate emissions, when 
this appear to be the case only because of cuts in food production (Searchinger et al., 
2015).  
    
Socially constructed ignorance can also be defined as the institutional hegemonization 
of a given story-telling - i.e. the pre-analytical choice of a given set of relevant 
narratives, plausible explanations and pertinent perceptions and representations - which 
is assumed, by default, to be valid in normative, descriptive and ethical terms to deal 
with any problem.  
 
This choice may determine situations in which the elephant in the room goes unnoticed, 
especially after the chosen story-telling has been dressed by a convenient suite of 
selected indicators and mathematical modelling.  
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Famous instances of missed elephants are the presidential address to the American 
Economic Association of the Nobel laureate in Economics Robert Lucas in 2003 
announcing that the “central problem of depression-prevention has been solved” once 
and for all; and the 2004 the ‘great moderation’ speech of Barnenke, Chair of the US 
Federal Reserve, about the successful taming of volatility of business cycle fluctuations.  
In both cases top ranking exponents of the ruling paradigm were unaware of the 
possibility of the financial collapse that would lead to the world economic crisis in the 
next years.  
 
These blunders have fed into the long standing dispute for a reconsideration of the 
prevailing paradigm in Economics (Reinert, 2008, Mirowki, 2013), and even within the 
ranks of the discipline new curricula are being studied (INET, 2013). More radically 
some voices have called for a reconsideration of Economics as the authoritative 
discipline to adjudicate social and environmental issues (Ravetz, 1994, Giampietro, 
2012, p.xx, Fourcade et al., 2014).  Noting the state of the economic discipline as used 
to solve socioeconomic problems one cannot help considering the possibility that the 
discipline might have reverted to (or never emancipated from) a state of immaturity. In 
a chapter entitled ‘Immature and ineffective fields of inquiry’ Jerome R. Ravetz remarks 
(1971, p. 366):   
 
[…] The situation becomes worse when an immature or ineffective field is 
enlisted in the work of resolution of some practical problem. In such an 
uncontrolled and perhaps uncontrollable context, where facts are few and 
political passions many, the relevant immature field functions to a great extent 
as a 'folk-science'. This is a body of accepted knowledge whose function is not to 
provide the basis for further advance, but to offer comfort and reassurance to 
some body of believers. 
 
In order to prove the falsehood of inference constructed by heavy modelling weaponry 
one does not need the language of mathematics, but plain English. To make an example, 
a critique of the already mentioned dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models 
DSGE (used as policy instruments) is possible by falsifying the underlying hypotheses 
of ‘efficient markets’ and ‘representative agent’ (Mirowski, 2013, pp 275-286). This is 
why we keep referring to semantics and story-telling in relation to the issue of framing. 
There is nothing new in this approach. Translating into English the result of 
mathematical elaboration was a teaching of Alfred Marshall (Pigou, Ed., 1925, p. 427), 
a teaching which is not unknown to present day economists (Krugman, 2009, p. 9) but 
which is often neglected when using mathematical modelling as Latin, to obfuscate 
rather than to illuminate (Saltelli et al., 2013).   
 
Note that we are discussing here the use of mathematical models as an input to policy, 
e.g. as a tool to generate inferences for policy. For Joseph Stiglitz (2011):   
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Models by their nature are like blinders. In leaving out certain things, they focus 
our attention on other things. They provide a frame through which we see the 
world. 
 
There is nothing wrong in using blinders in the quest for theoretical progress. The issue 
is when the same tool is used to prescribe policy, expediently neglecting the blinding 
stage. This is what Nassim Taleb (2007) condemns as an attempt to ‘Platonify reality’. 
This is also one of the processes by which hypocognition is generated. Rayner see this 
as one of the strategies to socially construct ignorance and calls it ‘displacement’:  
 
[…] displacement occurs when an organization engages with an issue, but 
substitutes management of a representation of a problem (such as a computer 
model) for management of the represented object or activity.  
 
Displacement does not imply wrong models – which could possibly be corrected, but 
irrelevant models, which cannot be corrected through “learning by doing” and hence 
can do damage for a longer period of time. Along similar lines Financial Times 
columnist Samuel Brittain notes (2011):  
 
Nothing has done more to discredit serious economic analysis than its 
identification with the guesses about output, employment, prices and so on which 
politicians feel obliged to make. […] True scientific predictions are conditional. 
They assert that certain changes […] will, granted other conditions are met, 
[…], lead to a certain state of affairs […]. But they cannot tell us that the 
required conditions will be fulfilled. 
  
Evidence based policy has thus reached a situation of paradox, where all know and 
repeat that a certain practice – displacement in Rayner’s lingo – is incorrect, but it is 
pursued nevertheless. In this way society is led to associate the stabilization of its own 
wellbeing with the stabilization of the institutional settings determining the status quo.  
 
 
2.3  Legitimacy versus simplification  
 
So far the conventional scientific approach has dealt with sustainability issues trying to 
individuate the best course of action by using deterministic models.  This strategy 
assumes that it is possible to predict the behaviour of complex self-organizing systems 
(including those that are reflexive such as human societies) and that the quality of the 
scientific input to the policy process is ensured by the rigour of the methods deployed. 
This assumption overlooks the accumulation of uncertainties which – when properly 
appraised – implies the total inability of these tools to generate useful inference.    
 
Thus we expect for example that modelling approaches which have failed to predict a 
purely financial and economic crisis will be able to inform us about the behaviour of a 
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system involving institutions, societies, economies and ecologies, such as we do when 
applying the craft of cost benefit analysis (CBA) to climate change, and pretend to 
assess the impact on the economy of increased crime rates resulting from hotter 
temperatures (Rhodium Group, 2014). 
 
Climate instead calls into operation the multiple connections involved in the nexus 
between energy, water, food and the reproduction of human institutions. The 
complexity of the organization of socio-ecosystems is not an issue to be solved, but an 
inherent property of the self-organizing systems considered, i.e. ecosystems and human 
societies. These systems express agency (reproducing themselves and interacting with 
each other) across a variety of relevant scales. When dealing with them analysing a 
dimension at the time (water, energy, food, land use) and a scale at the time (local, 
meso, macro) does not work and provides unlimited scope for undesired blows from the 
law of unintended consequences (Giampietro, 2013).  When science is used to suppress 
uncertainty - rather than to explore the sources of our ignorance - failures are likely.  
These may take the form of adopting by default the “more of the same” policy, even if 
the specific policy did not work in the past.  Scientific activity that is forced to operate 
systematically outside its field of applicability is likely to become “bad science”, 
because it is impossible to check its usefulness for guiding action.  This use of 
quantification will facilitate abuse and corruption. As noted by Porter  (1995):  
 
The appeal of numbers is especially compelling to bureaucratic officials who 
lack the mandate of a popular election, or divine right. Arbitrariness and bias 
are the most usual grounds upon which such officials are criticized. A decision 
made by the numbers (or by explicit rules of some other sort) has at least the 
appearance of being fair and impersonal. Scientific objectivity thus provides an 
answer to a moral demand for impartiality and fairness. Quantification is a way 
of making decisions without seeming to decide. Objectivity lends authority to 
officials who have very little of their own. 
 
 
Section 3. The solution: establishing a new relation between 
science and governance 
 
The paradigm of evidence based policy is based on the assumption of prediction and 
control, which may be used to eliminate “scruples”, intended as feelings of doubt or 
hesitation with regard to the morality or propriety of a given course of action. Our 
suggestion is to take as a deliberate strategy the goal of reintroducing doubts and 
scruples in the process of deliberation, somewhat closer to Montaigne, somewhat farther 
from Descartes (Toulmin, 1990).  
 
The task of guaranteeing the quality of the process of production and use of scientific 
information for governance must have as objective to minimize the negative effect of 
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hypocognition on the final choice of a policy. For this reason it is essential to study the 
process of formalization of the chosen issue definition, e.g. how the frame was 
constructed, in semantic terms, and how this selection has cascaded into a predefined set 
of data, indicators and mathematical models. In this section we try advance a few 
suggestions to this end. 
 
3.1 Responsible use of quantitative information 
 
A first requirement for a better use of science for policy is a responsible use of 
quantitative information, away from indicators rich in spurious accuracy and fantastic 
model-generated numbers.  This requires the adoption of specific tools of quality 
control. Practical tools developed in the context of PNS to address these topics are 
NUSAP and sensitivity auditing. 
 
• NUSAP is a notational system called for the management and communication of 
uncertainty in science for policy, based on five categories for characterizing any 
quantitative statement: Numeral, Unit, Spread, Assessment and Pedigree 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; van der Sluijs et al., 2005; see also 
http://www.nusap.net/). 
 
• Sensitivity auditing (Saltelli et al., 2013; Saltelli and Funtowicz, 2014) extends 
sensitivity analysis as used in the context of mathematical modelling to settings 
where the models are used to produce inference for policy. Sensitivity auditing 
questions the broader implications of the modelling exercise, its frame, its 
assumptions, the assessment of the uncertainties, the transparency of the 
inference, the veracity of the sensitivity analysis and the legitimacy of the 
assessment.     
 
3.2 Taming scientific hubris  
 
Frank H. Knight observed in 1921 that:  
 
We live in a world of contradiction and paradox, a fact of which perhaps the 
most fundamental illustration is this: that the existence of a problem of 
knowledge depends on the future being different from the past, while the 
possibility of the solution of the problem depends on the future being like the 
past. 
 
We suggest a re-learning of Knight’s warning, and a stronger reconsideration of the 
differences between risks, that can be computed, versus uncertainties, which cannot. 
Ignoring this lesson will transform us in the character of the joke where a drunkard 
looks for his lost key under the lamppost, even though he knows that he lost it 
elsewhere, only because at least under the post there is light.  Nassim Nicholas Taleb 
calls this ‘The delusion of uncertainty’. With Bryan Wynne (1992) we would also like 
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to extend this taxonomy of uncertainties to include dimensions of ignorance and 
indeterminacy, i.e.: 
 
RISK - Know the odds. 
UNCERTAINTY - Don’t know the odds: may know the main parameters. May 
reduce uncertainty but increase ignorance. 
IGNORANCE - Don’t know what we don’t know. Ignorance increases with 
increased commitments based on given knowledge. 
INDETERMINACY - Causal chains or networks open. 
 
For Wynne:  
 
Science can define a risk, or uncertainties, only by artificially ‘freezing’ a 
surrounding context which may or may not be this way in real-life situations. 
The resultant knowledge is therefore conditional knowledge, depending on 
whether these pre-analytical assumptions might turn out to be valid. But this 
question is indeterminate - for example, will the high quality of maintenance, 
inspection, operation, etc., of a risky technology be sustained in future, 
multiplied over replications, possibly many all over the world?  
 
The taming of scientific hubris is at the basis of a more effective use of science for 
governance.   
 
 
3.3 Evidence based policy versus robust policy  
 
We suggest moving beyond ‘evidence based policy’ – and its related hyper 
quantification based on simplified narratives – toward ‘robust policy’ based on a 
strategy of filtering of potential policies in a context of falsification. We call this ‘robust 
policy’ borrowing from Helga Nowotny’s (2003) concept of socially robust knowledge: 
a kind of knowledge that has been filtered through the lenses of different stakeholders 
and normative stances.    
 
Thus the quality check on proposed policies and narratives about governance could be 
carried out using the method of falsification with respect to:  
 
• feasibility (compatibility with external constraints),  
• viability (compatibility with internal constraints) and  
• desirability (compatibility with normative values adopted in the given society).   
 
If the policy will result unfeasible or unviable or undesirable in relation to one of the 
quality checks we would have individuated either a bottleneck or a political issue or a 
true impossibility to be dealt with.  No more prediction and control leading to planning 
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and optimization, but rather strategic learning through falsification leading to flexible 
management.   
 
This approach has elements of similarity with the strategy suggested by Rayner (2012) 
to overcome socially constructed ignorance: the idea of ‘clumsy solutions’. While 
socially constructed ignorance helps to keep ‘uncomfortable knowledge’ at bay, clumsy 
solutions allow it to be processed:  
 
Clumsy solutions may emerge from complex processes of both explicit and 
implicit negotiation. In other words, solutions are clumsy when those 
implementing them converge on or accept a common course of action for 
different reasons or on the basis of unshared epistemological or ethical 
principles […] They are inherently satisficing […] rather than optimizing 
approaches, since each of the competing solutions is optimal from the standpoint 
of the proposer. Clumsy solutions are inherently pluralistic […] 
 
Clumsy solutions resonate with the ‘working deliberatively within imperfections’ of the 
Post Normal Science’s extended participation model, and with the ‘rediscovery of 
ignorance’ advocated by Ravetz (2015, p. xviii). 
 
A key step in the identification of the feasibility, viability and desirability domains 
entails looking at the state of affair through different lens – i.e. dimensions and scales of 
analysis  This predicament for quantitative analysis becomes systemic in sustainability 
analysis (Giampietro et al. 2013; 2014): when checking the feasibility of food security 
against external constraints (context/black-box - agriculture) we have to measure 
requirements and supply in terms of kg of potatoes, vegetables and animal products.  
However, if we want to check the viability of food security in relation to internal 
constraints (black box/internal parts – human diet) we have to measure requirements 
and supply in terms of kcal of carbohydrates, proteins and fats.  In the same way, when 
checking the feasibility of energy security against external constraints (context/black-
box - “primary energy sources”) we have to measure relevant physical quantities in 
terms of tons of coal, kinetic energy of falling water, cubic meters of natural gas, 
whereas if we want to check the viability in relation to internal constraints (black 
box/internal parts - “energy carriers”) we have to measure relevant quantities in terms of 
kWh of electricity, MJ of fuels. This epistemological predicament is generated by the 
fact that different types of quantitative assessments are non-equivalent and cannot be 
compressed to a single indicator (Giampietro et al. 2006). Quantitative representations 
useful to study feasibility are not equivalent to quantitative representations useful to 
study viability and the information given by these two typologies of representations 
cannot be used to study desirability without involving in the discussion those social 
actors carrying legitimate but contrasting normative values. 
 
Only after having operationalized the definition of these three domains it becomes 
possible to carry out an informed deliberation for evaluating policies having the goal of 
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balancing efficiency with adaptability in view of sustainability. This may possibly feed 
into a multi-criteria characterization of the proposed solutions with respect to the 
different normative ingredients.   
 
The proposed approach is equivalent to exploring a multi-dimensional space with a 
parsimonious and appropriate experimental design, instead of concentrating an 
unrealistic degree of detail around a single point in this space.   
 
 
3.4 Quantitative story telling for governance 
 
The widening of the set of available ‘frames’ may be achieved via a quantitative ‘story-
telling for governance’, with the goal of generating plausible and relevant stories 
capable of reducing hypocognition in the chosen issue definition/problem structuring – 
a strategy also suggested by ‘cognitive activist’ George Lakoff (2014).  
 
Quantitative story telling has the goal of guaranteeing the quality of the chosen story-
telling in the given socio-economic and ecological context.  The quality of the story-
telling has to do with the reduction of the negative effects of the hypocognition 
associated with the chosen problem structuring – the unavoidable neglecting of relevant 
narratives (relevant “known knowns” and “known unknowns”) and the unavoidable 
presence of “unknown unknowns”.  The fitness of different policy options can then be 
gauged from the integration of a robust mix of relevant narratives, plausible 
explanations and pertinent perceptions.  
 
This qualitative check of the coherence of the quantitative information generated by 
non-equivalent models is essential.  In fact, models are by-products of the pre-analytical 
choice of relevant causal relations and data are by-products of the pre-analytical choice 
of relevant perceptions.  Confronted with numbers coming from several non-equivalent 
descriptive domains (logically incoherent quantitative representations) one can no 
longer rely on big data and sophisticated algorithms. Without a quality check on the 
chosen story-telling more data and larger models developed within arbitrarily 
constrained explanations and perceptions will only increase the level of indeterminacy 
and uncertainty of the results. 
 
The usefulness of the chosen stories needs to be validated using quantitative analysis 
that must remain coherent across scales and dimensions – i.e. a multi-scale integrated 
analysis of the functioning of socio-ecological systems, inclusive of their level of 
openness, e.g. to trade relationships, lest relevant aspects of the problems are simply 
externalized.  
 
 
3.5 Getting the right narratives before crunching numbers  
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In his ‘plea for reasonableness versus rationality’ Stephen Toulmin (1990, 2001) 
contrasts the ideal of Renaissance Humanism against the Renaissance scientific 
revolution, which he considers as a counter-Renaissance, where Descartes’ certainties 
replace the doubts of Montaigne. In order to return to reason, he warns, we need to ‘do 
the right sums’ more than we need to ‘do the sums right’ (2001, p.66). This implies a 
careful selection of the stories to be told before indicators are built, data collected and 
models run. We need to explore more frames as opposed to selecting just one and filling 
it with numbers.  
 
We can illustrate this with the persisting controversy surrounding the use of genetically 
modified organism, a quintessential wicked issue.   
 
The journal ‘The Economist’, discussing a GMO labelling scheme in Vermont (US) 
commented recently (2014): 
 
Montpelier is America’s only McDonald’s-free state capital. A fitting place, 
then, for a law designed to satisfy the unfounded fears of foodies […] genetically 
modified crops, declared safe by the scientific establishment, but reviled as 
Frankenfoods by the Subarus-and-sandals set.  
 
For those unfamiliar with this kind of jargon, Frankenfood is GMO based food as 
defined by its opponents, while the Subarus-and-sandals set is an The Economist’s own 
synecdoche to allude to those in Vermont who support a labelling scheme for GMO-
containing food. The image accompanying the piece shows a hippy-looking public 
protesting against GMO. We use this as a vivid illustration of what any reader knows: 
opposition to GMO food is normally portrayed as a Luddite, anti-science position, and 
this because GMOs are treated as a nutritional ‘risk to health issue’.  Against this 
irrational position science has ‘spoken’ by declaring GMO’s safe for human 
consumption, thus modern societies should by law permit (or even force, in the name of 
progress) their production and consumption.   
 
This frame clashes against the reality of citizens’ true concern, as measured e.g.by 
Marris et al., (2001).  In the list of citizens’ concerns gathered through participatory 
processes, the issue of food safety seems to be conspicuously absent, whereas a 
complete different set of crucial questions are instead posed: 
 
• Why do we need GMOs? What are the benefits? 
• Who will benefit from their use? 
• Who decided that they should be developed and how? 
• Why were we not better informed about their use in our food, before their 
arrival on the market?  
• Why are we not given an effective choice about whether or not to buy 
and consume these products? 
20 
 
• Do regulatory authorities have sufficient powers and resources to 
effectively counter-balance large companies who wish to develop these 
products? 
 
The variety of frames revealed by these concerns reveals that the prevailing frame ‘safe 
GMO food versus recalcitrant citizens’ is “irrelevant” for the decision to be taken.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The evidence based policy paradigm should be revised because it uses science to 
reinforce hypocognition.  Evidence based policy cannot be separated by policy based 
evidence.  The accumulation of data, indicators and mathematical modelling in support 
to a given frozen framing of an issue obfuscates and distracts from the important task 
which is the semantic opening of the frame. A quantitative problem structuring may 
empower those that have selected the given story-telling to eliminate, through induced 
hypocognition, uncomfortable knowledge (Rayner, 2012). Spurious precision and 
disproportionate mathematics deter the use of plain English to question the premises of 
an analysis. This is not a new finding. Already in 1986 (p.138-154) Langdon Winner 
warned ecologists not to fall into the trap of risk and cost benefit analyses:  
 
“[T]he risk debate is one that certain kinds of social interests can expect to lose 
by the very act of entering. (…) Fortunately, many issues talked about as risks 
can be legitimately described in other ways. Confronted with any cases of past, 
present, or obvious future harm, it is possible to discuss that harm directly 
without pretending that you are playing craps. A toxic waste disposal site placed 
in your neighborhood need not be defined as a risk; it might appropriately be 
defined as a problem of toxic waste. Air polluted by automobiles and industrial 
smokestacks need not be defined as a ‘risk’; it might still be called by the old-
fashioned name, ‘pollution’. New Englanders who find acid rain falling on them 
are under no obligation to begin analyzing the ‘risks of acid rain’; they might 
retain some Yankee stubbornness and confound the experts by talking about 
‘that destructive acid rain’ and what's to be done about it. A treasured natural 
environment endangered by industrial activity need not be regarded as 
something at ‘risk’; one might regard it more positively as an entity that ought 
to be preserved in its own right”. 
 
Complex adaptive systems, be these the labour market of a country or its forests, are 
reflexive and continuously becoming “something else” in order to reproduce themselves 
(Prigogine, 1980).  For this reason it is impossible to predict deterministically their 
future states, because if they manage to reproduce themselves in the long run, they can 
do so only by moving in a finite time between states that have to be simultaneously: 
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• feasible – compatible with boundary conditions determined by process outside 
human control; 
• viable – compatible with the structure of internal parts and their system of 
control; 
• desirable – compatible with normative values used to legitimize the social 
contract keeping together the social fabric. 
 
In this situation any definition of what should be considered as “feasible”, “viable” and 
“desirable” has to be continuously updated.  Changes in the processes outside human 
control will determine changes in boundary conditions (changing the definition of the 
feasibility domain), in the same way as the full range of consequences of changes taking 
place in processes under human control, when spreading across scales and dimensions, 
may impact both the viability and the desirability of a trajectory, again impairing long 
term deterministic predictions. 
   
In human societies, shared normative values (frames) are the result of negotiation and 
shifting of power relations (Lakoff, 2014). This implies that even those story-tellings, 
strategies, and narratives that resulted useful for guiding human action in a given 
historic period may become useless (and therefore potentially dangerous as misleading) 
when the meanings they assign to the terms “feasibility”, “viability” and “desirability” 
in relation to the stated goals has changed. To make an example, the ‘Endless Frontier’ 
metaphor is today less convincing than it was right after Word War II. Not only is now 
science perceived as an instrument of profit and power as discussed in section 1, but its 
crisis has dramatically curtailed its rate of progress (Le Fanu, 2009, 2010).  In this 
respect the acritical adoption of prevailing narratives can be fatal. Already in the XIX 
century Giacomo Leopardi considered ‘Fashion’ more deadly that ‘Death’.    
 
To make another example at the hearth of present economic dispute the neo-classical 
Economics narrative of perpetual growth based on continuous innovation supposed to 
reduce inequity through a trickle-down effect was meaningful for developed economies 
experiencing a period of maximum expansion in their pace of economic activity.  As 
suggested by Daly (1992) the evolution from an “empty world” (a low population on 
the planet) to a “full world” (a large population on the planet) means more stringent 
external constraints and a larger environmental impact of human activity.  This 
translates into a reduction in the pace of economic expansion and an increase in 
inequality within societies – i.e. an increase in troubles with internal constraints.  As an 
example of what is meant by trouble one can recall here the present debate on the 
virtues and faults of capitalism qua capitalism (Piketty, 2013; Bellamy Foster and 
Yates, 2014), and the linkages between increased inequality and increasing scope for 
rent seeking and corruption by the elites (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
 
As any re-adjustment of normative values (requiring large power shifts) is problematic, 
what is the role the science should play in this re-adjustment of the meanings to be 
assigned to the concept of “feasibility”, “viability” and “desirability”?  
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So far, the role of science for governance and sustainability has been that of a driver of 
techno-scientification of human progress.  As discussed in section 2 this strategy 
represents a full endorsement of the ideas of Bacon, Condorcet and Bush that all human 
problems can be solved by science and technology.   Many institutional actors seem to 
be mired in the old strategy of prediction and control, making plans informed e.g. by the 
results of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models whose inadequacy we 
discussed in Section 2, or by cost benefit analyses of the impact of climate on economy 
and society extending one hundred year into the future (Saltelli and d’Hombres, 2011, 
Rhodium Group, 2014). A disturbing symptom of this practice is the delirious precision 
of the estimates we are fed with.  
 
* ‘D.C. climate will shift in 2047’ (Bernstein, 2013); 
 
* ‘August 22 was Earth Overshoot Day. In 8 Months, Humanity Exhausted Earth’s 
Budget for the Year’ (Global Footprint Network, 2014); for a criticism of this estimate 
see Giampietro and Saltelli (2014). 
 
Used in this distorted way mathematical modelling finishes to play the religious or 
ritualistic role of haruspices. The use of the term ‘ritual’ is not exaggerated here. Nobel 
laureate Kenneth Arrow experienced the same impression. During the Second World 
War he was a weather officer in the US Army Air Corps working on the production of 
month-ahead weather forecasts, and this is how he tells the story (Szenberg, 1992): 
 
The statisticians among us subjected these forecasts to verification and they 
differed in no way from chance. The forecasters themselves were convinced and 
requested that the forecasts be discontinued. The reply read approximately like 
this: “The commanding general is well aware that the forecasts are no good. 
However, he needs them for planning purposes”.  
 
Richard Feynman in his Caltech’s 1974 Commencement Address “Some remarks on 
science pseudoscience and learning how not to fool yourself” calls this type of use of 
science as “cargo cult science”:  
 
“In the South Seas there is a cargo cult of people. During the war they saw 
airplanes land with lots of good materials, and they want the same thing to 
happen now. So they've arranged to imitate things like runways, to put fires 
along the sides of the runways, to make a wooden hut for a man to sit in, with 
two wooden pieces on his head like headphones and bars of bamboo sticking out 
like antennas--he's the controller--and they wait for the airplanes to land.”  
“They're doing everything right. The form is perfect. It looks exactly the way it 
looked before. But it doesn't work. No airplanes land. So I call these things 
cargo cult science, because they follow all the apparent precepts and forms of 
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scientific investigation, but they're missing something essential, because the 
planes don't land.” 
 
Science provided to western societies incredible achievements, and many believe that 
the same achievements will be now obtained also by all the other countries. What is 
missed by those holding this hope is the awareness that many problems solved by 
progress in western countries were solved by externalizing to someone else (the 
environment, future generations, other countries) the negative consequences of the 
increased level of consumption of resources per capita.  Things are quite different when 
considering the sustainability of technical progress of the whole world.  At the global 
level there is no room for externalization – it is a zero-sum game, what goes around 
comes around – and there is no “free-lunch” - someone is paying or will pay what is 
consumed. We must thus deal with an inextricable nexus between physical, biological, 
social and ethical issues. The hope that this issue will be tackled by more computer 
power, more complicated models, huge databases, and more rigour in the scientific 
method leaves us with a “sustainability science” which resembles “cargo cult science”.  
The problem with this type of sustainability science is that, as suggested by Feynman, in 
spite of the frenetic activity of its practitioners “planes don’t land”.     
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